- a coelo usque ad centrum : In principle, the extent of the right of the owner.
- a fortiori : Much more, with stronger reason.
- a la : After the manner of.
- a mensa et thoro : From table and bed (from ‘board and bed’). It is a term used to describe a partial divorce in a case in which the marriage was just and lawful; but, for some supervening cause, such as the commission of adultery or cruelty by the husband or wife it becomes improper or impossible for them to live together. The partial divorce was earlier effected by the Ecclesiastical Court. It only caused the separation of husband and wife; but did not dissolve the marriage so that neither of them could marry during the life of the other. This is now substituted by section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act. Thus, a divorce ‘a mensa et thoro’ has to be distinguished from a regular divorce and also from a divorce ‘a vinculo mariytimonii’, which means a decree for nullity. (R. S. Manual Raju v. Mary Sara AIR 1982 Kar. 235)
- a posse ad esse : From possibility to reality.
- a posteriori : (From the effect to the cause) Inductive reasoning; pertaining to the process of reasoning whereby principles or other propositions are derived from observations of facts.
- a priori : From cause to effect; deductive reasoning; pertaining to the line of reasoning based on specific assumptions, rather than experience.
- a verbis legis non est recedendum : You must not vary the words of statute.
- ab initio : From the beginning.
- ab intestato: From an intestate (Person); Succession to property of a person who has not made a will.
- ab intra : From within.
- absolute sententia expositore non indiget: Plain language does not need an interpretation. (Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 504)
- absque hoc : Without this.
- absque tali causa : Without such cause.
- abundans cautela non nacet : There is no harm in being cautious The presumption that Parliament may be presumed not to make superfluous legislation, the presumption is not a strong presumption and the statutes are full of provisions introduced because abundans cautela non nacet (there is no harm in being cautious) (Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of AP AIR 1981 SC 1473)
- act in pais: Judicial or other act performed out of court and not a matter of record.
- acta jure gestionis : Commercial acts.
- acta jure imperii : Governmental acts. The test what constitutes an act jure imperii is whether the act in question is of its own character a governmental act, as opposed to an act which any private citizen can perform. It follows that in the case of acts by a separate entity it is not enough that the entity should have acted on the directions of the State, because such an act need not possess the character of a governmental act. To attract immunity, what is done by a separate entity must be something which possesses the character of a governmental act, the entity will not be entitled to state immunity. Likewise, in the absence of such character the mere fact that the purpose or motive of the act was to serve the purposes of the State will not be sufficient to enable separate entity to claim immunity. [see Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Co. [1995] 1 WLR 1147 (HL)]. It is clear, therefore, that— (a) it is first necessary to consider what is the relevant act of the separate entity which forms the basis of the claim of immunity; (b) to qualify for immunity, the act must be govenmental rather than commercial in character; (c) this is a question of the analysis of particular facts against the whole context in which they have occurred; (d) if the act in question is not governmental, the mere fact that the purpose or motive of the act was to serve the purposes of the State will not be sufficient to enable the separate entity to claim immunity. [see In re, Banco Nacional De Cuba [2002] 1 WLR 2039 (Ch.D)/110 Comp. Cas. 889] In the case of a central bank, for example, line
- actio : An action; the right of suing before a judge for what it is due; also proceedings or a form of procedure for the enforcement of such right.
- actio personalis moritur cum persona : A personal right of action dies with the person. When he dies, the suit should Pedasubhayya v. Kakumanu Akkamma AIR 1958 SC 1042.) The expression, thus, operates in a limited class of actions ex delicto such as action for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not assuming the death of the party, and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory – Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain AIR 1967 SC 1124.
- benificium invito non datur : A benefit cannot be conferred upon a person unwilling to accept it
- benignae faciendae sunt interpretationes et verba intentioni debent inservire : Liberal interpretation should be the rule, and the words should be made to carry out the intention.
- benignior sententia, in verbis generalibus seu dubiis, est praeferenda : The most favourable construction is to be placed on general or doubtful expression.
- bona : Good
- bona fide : Literally, it means “in good faith”, but used in English as an adjective with the meaning of “genuine”, “without fraud”. “Bona fide” means in good faith or genuinely. It conveys absence of intent to deceive. (Smt. Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Dass Tek Chand AIR 1965 Punj. 188.) It refers to honest intention. (See Madhurilata Devi v. Gourapada Basak AIR 1985 NOC 18 (Gauhati).) Bona fide is a mental state negativating dishonesty and has no relation to negligence or want of care. It only means negation of fraud or dishonesty and a real genuine transaction. Although the meaning of good faith may vary in the context of different statutes, subjects and situations, honest intention free from taint or fraud or fraudulent design is a constant element of its connotation [Brijendra Singh v. State of UP AIR 1981 SC 636]. The essence of “good faith” is honesty. It precludes pretence or lack of fairness and uprightness [Sardar Gur Iqbal Singh v. CIT [1992] 197 ITR 269 (All.)]. Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act defines ‘good faith’ as “a thing shall be deemed to be done in ‘good faith’ where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not”. ‘Good faith’ would mean anything done honestly, whether done negligently or not. A person could not be said to be acting honestly where he has a suspicion that there is something wrong and does not make further enquiries. Being aware of possible harm to others and acting in spite thereof is acting with reckless disregard of consequences. It is worse than negligence for negligent action is that the consequence of which the law presumes to be present in the mind of the negligent person, whether actually it was there or not. This legal presumption is drawn through the well-known hypothetical reasonable man. For the purposes of judging whether anything was done in good faith what is to be seen is whether an authority or individual, being aware of a possible harm to the others, acts in spite thereof in reckless disregard of consequences. If it is so, it would be a case, so far as the actual state of mind of the actor is relevant, of mala fides. It would appear that for purposes of the definition of the expression ‘done in good faith’ as given in section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, any action taken by a person being aware of possible harm to others in total reckless disregard of the consequences can be treated as not honest. In deciding the question of good faith, what comes into consideration is the intention of honesty and the absence of bad faith or mala fide. (Shareef Ahmad v. CWT [1979] 117 ITR 35 (All.)) It is pertinent to note section 52 of the Indian Penal Code which defines ‘good faith’ as nothing is said to be done or believed in ‘good faith’ which is done or believed without due care or attention. For purposes of criminal liability, anything which is done or believed without care and attention, cannot be said to have been done or believed in good faith. In quasi-criminal proceedings like penalty proceedings, it is this definition which in any case would be more relevant in judging the state of mind of the person for the purposes of arriving at a conclusion, whether or not there is a conscious concealment. If this definition is borne in mind, it would be apparent that cases of gross neglect which would necessarily involve want of due care and attention, would prove a guilty state of mind. (CIT v. Drapco Electric Corpn. [1980] 122 ITR 341 (Guj.).) If the assessee by his gross neglect, brings about avoidance or evasion of tax thereby causing loss to the public revenue, he could not be said to have acted in good faith. The conclusion can be legitimately reached in that case that gross neglect is equal to lacking in bona fides. The element of honesty which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the General Clauses Act is not introduced by the definition of the Indian Penal Code, it is to be enquired whether a person acted with due care and attention. There is no doubt that its mere plea that the accused believed that what he stated was true by itself, will not sustain his case of good faith. Simple belief or actual belief by itself is not enough. The person must show that the belief in his impugned statement has a rational basis and is not just a blind simple belief. (Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1966 SC 97.)
- bona gestura : Good behaviour
- cadit quaestio : The matter admits of no further argument
- caeteris paribus : Other things being equal
- casus fortuitus : A matter of chance
- casus omissus : The omissions in a statute cannot be supplied by construction. If a particular case is omitted from the term of the statute, though such a case is within the obvious purpose of the statute and the omission appears to have been done by accident or inadvertence, the court cannot include the omitted case by supplying the omission. (See CIT v. K.S. Vaidyanathan [1985] 153 ITR 11 (Mad.) (FB).) The courts are no doubt to harmonise the various provisions of an Act, it is certainly not the duty of the courts to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill the gaps or omissions in the provisions of the Act. (See Hira Devi v. D.B. Shahjahanpur 1952 SCR 1122.) A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court, except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. (CIT v. National Taj Traders [1980] 121 ITR 535 (SC).)
- causa causae est causa causti : The cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused. The cause of the cause is to be considered as the cause of the effect also (see Black’s Law Dictionary) [see Callipers Naigai Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [2005] 128 Comp. Cas. 730 (Delhi)]
- causa causans : The immediate cause. The last link in the chain of causation. It is to be distinguished from causa sine qua non which means some preceding but for which the causa causans could not have become operative.
- causa justa : A true or just cause.
- causa mortis : In respect of death.
- causa proxima, non remota spectatur : The immediate and not the remote cause is to be regarded
- causa sine qua non : An indispensable cause/condition
- cause sine qua non : A necessary or inevitable cause A cause without which the effect in question could not have happened (see Black’s Law Dictionary) [see Callipers Naigai Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [2005] 128 Comp. Cas. 730 (Delhi)]
- caveat emptor : Let the buyer beware
- caveat venditor : Let the seller beware
- certiorari : Certiorari is a prerogative writ of Supreme Court to call for the records of the inferior court or a body acting in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity. An essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is exercised not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. (Sewpujanrai Indrasanarai v. Collector of Customs AIR 1958 SC 845.)
- certum est quod certum reddi potest : That which is capable of being made certain is to be treated as certain.
- cessante causa, cessat effectus : When the cause ceases, the effect ceases
- cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex : The reason of the law ceasing; the law itself ceases. The maxim applies to the principles of common law, but not to any considerable extent to statute law. A law does not cease to be operative because it is out of keeping with the present time. But this principle does not apply where custom outlines the conditions which gave it birth. (Mirza Raja v. Pushpavathi Wisweswar [1964] 2 SCR 403.)
- cestui que trust : A person for whom another is trustee, beneficiary
- cestui que vie : The person for whose life the land is held
- ceteris paribus : Other things being equal
- chirographum apud debitorem repertum praesumitur solutum : A deed or bond found with the debtor is presumed to be paid
- circulars in probando : Arguing in a circle, using the conclusion as one of the arguments.
- civiliter mortuus : Civilly dead
- clam, vi, aut precario (By stealth, violence, and entreaty) : By steal, force or licence
- clausula generalis de residuo non ea complectituri, quoe non ejusdem sint generis cum lis quoe speciatim dicta fuerunt : A general clause of residuum does not comprehend those things which may not be of the same kind as those which have been especially expressed. This is the well known ‘ejusdem generis rule’. The rule is that where a list of particular things of a single genus is followed by general words, the latter will be taken as having been intended to fill in any gaps left in the enumeration of the genus and to extent beyond it
- clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa : A general clause does not refer to things expressed
- clausulae inconsuetae semper inducunt suspicionem : Unusual clauses always excite suspicion
- cogitationis poenam nemo patitur : The thoughts and intents of men are not punishable. For the Devil himself knoweth not the mind of a man
- cognati : Cognate persons related to each other by blood
- cognitor : An agent appointed to act for another in an action
- cohaeredes sunt quasi unum corpus, propter unitatem juris quod habent : Co-heirs are regarded as one person on account of the unity of title which they possess.
- collateral : By the side of. Accompanying as secondary or subordinate secured or guaranteed by additional security
- collatio bonorum : Bringing into hotchpot
- comitatus : A country
- commixtio : The mixing together of materials belonging to different owners, the product being held in common or divided in proportion to the shares contributed.
- commodatum : A kind of bailment
- commodum ex injuria sua memo habere debet : Convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong. To put it in other words, no one can be allowed to benefit from his own wrongful act.
7(Mritunjoy Pani v. Narmada Bala Sasmal 1962 (1) SCR 290.) - communis error facit jus : Common error some time makes law
- compensatio : Set-off
- compos mentis : Of sound mind
- compromissarii sunt judices : Arbitrators are judges
- conditio : The general term for a personal action
- conditio praecedens adimpleri debet prius quam sequatur effectus : A condition precedent must be fulfilled before the effect can follow. In case of a conditional contract the condition precedent must happen before either party becomes bound by the contract.
- conditio sine qua non : An essential condition
- conductio : A hiring
- confer/cf : Consult; compare
- confirmatio est nulla ubi donum proecedens est invalidum : An illegal act cannot be rendered valid by a subsequent confirmation
- confusio : The mixing of liquids belonging to different owners. The product was held in common or divided in proportion to the shares contributed.
- consensus ad idem : Agreement as to the same thing. The common consent necessary for a binding contract. Thus, there should be consensus ad idem for concluded contracts. Section 25(1) of the Contract Act contemplates that when a transfer is without consideration, it is void contract. The acquiescence does not
amount to consent [John Tinson & Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Mrs. Surjeet Malhan [1997] 88 Comp. Cas. 750 (SC)]. - consensus facit legem : Consent makes law. Parties to a contract are legally bound to do what they have agreed to do.
- consent tollit errorem : Consent takes away error. The acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an error obviates its effect. On this maxim depends the doctrine of waiver
- consentientes et agentes pari poena plectentur : Those consenting and those perpetrating are embraced in the same punishment
- constat (It appears) : A copy, or exemplification
- consuetudo debet esse certa; nam incerta pro nullis habentur : A custom should be certain, for uncertain things are held as nothing. (Saraswathi Ammal v. Jagdamba AIR 1953 SC 205)
- consuetudo est altera lex : A custom has the law of force
- consuetudo est optimus interpress legum : Custom is the best interpreter of the laws
- consuetudo et communis assuetudo vincit legem non scriptam, si sit specialis; et interpretatur legem scriptam, si lex sit generalis : Custom and common usage overcome the unwritten law, if it be special; and interpret the written law, if it be general
- contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege : The best way to construe a document is to read it as it would have read when made. Contemporanea expositio is a well known doctrine of interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The “administrative construction” (i.e., the contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned, such a construction, commonly referred to as a practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight. It is highly persuasive. A contemporaneous exposition by administrative authorities is very useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expressions used in a statutory instrument. The aforesaid principle was approved by the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597, wherein their Lordships observed as under (page 612): “It was clear from these two circulars that the Central Board of Direct Taxes, which is the highest authority entrusted with the execution of the provisions of the Act, understood sub-section (2) as limited to cases where the consideration for the transfer has been understood by the assessee and this must be regarded as a strong circumstance supporting the construction which we are placing on that sub-section.” The principle was
reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise AIR 1991 SC 1028. The fundamental rule of construction is to find out the expressed intention of the Parliament. This maxim is not applied to a modern legislation. In a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time law was made, and unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation be given to words used to take in new facts and situations if the words are capable of comprehending them. (Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan AIR 1962 SC 159.) Courts in construing a statute give much weight to the interpretation put upon it at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it. (See Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass [1908] 1 LR 35 Cal. 701 and Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1049.) Thus the rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio is a well established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, quite apart from their binding character, are clearly in the nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing legitimate aid in the construction of a provision of the Indian Income-tax Act. (See K.P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC).) It however, cannot be applicable to comparatively modern statute. The maxim contemporanea expositio as laid down by Coke is applied in construing ancient statutes but not in interpreting Acts which are comparatively modern. The rule of construction which ought to be applied to a statute either modern or ancient is the same and that is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. However, it would be appropriate to attach wide meaning to the words used by the Legislature in a law made in remote ages when society was static. The position would be different with respect to the words used in a law made in a modern progressive society in which the frontiers of knowledge are fast expanding (See Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828 and Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra AIR 1962 SC 159.). - contra : Against; on the other hand
- contra formam statuti : Against the form of the statute
- contra proferentum : The doctrine that the construction least favourable to the person putting forward an instrument should be adopted against him
- cor, coram : In the presence of
- coram judice : In the presence of a judge; before a properly constituted appropriate court
- coram non judice : Before one who is not a judge, the proceedings are a nullity
- corpus : Body. The capital of a fund; as contrasted with income
- corpus delicti : Body, i.e., the gist of an offence. The facts which constitute an offence
- cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potest : Where an act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution [Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin [2003] 4 ILD 242 (SC)]
- cuilibet in sua arte perito est credendum : Every one who is skilled in his own art is to be believed.
- cuilibet licet juri pro se introducto renunciare : Every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. The maxim which sanctions the non-observance of the statutory provision is cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto [Lachoo Mal v. Radhey Shyam [1971] 1 SCC 619]
- cujus est dare ejus est disponere : He who gives anything can also direct how the
10gift is to be used. In Whitmore v. Mason [1861] 2 J&H 204 (Quoted in Money Markets Ltd. v. London Stock Exchange [2002] 1 WLR 1150/111 Comp. Cas. 658 it was observed, “…..And it was said, that the case resembled the ordinary condition of a demise of land, that in the event of the tenant becoming bankrupt, the land shall revert to the landlord. The principle upon which such a condition as last mentioned has been upheld in the case of a demise of land, is expressed in the maxim, ‘cujus est dare ejus est disponere’” - cujus est instituere ejus est abrogare : He that institutes may also abrogate
- cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum : Whose is the soil, his is also that which is above it
- culpa : Wrongful default
- culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertimenti : It is a fault for a man to medle in a matter not pertaining to him
- culpa lata : Gross negligence
- culpa levis : Slight negligence
- culpae paena par est : Let punishment be in proportion to the crime
- damnosa hereditas : An inheritance which was insolvent
- damnum absque injuria : Loss or damage for which there is no legal remedy
- damnum sentit dominus : The owner suffers the damage
- damnum sine injuria : Damage without injury, i.e., without infringement of any legal right. There may be damage or loss inflicted without any act being done
which the law deems an injury. For instance, harm may be caused by a person exercising his own rights or property (Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles [1895] AC 587.), by trade competition. (Mogul Steamship Co. v. Gregor Gow & Co. [1892] AC 25.) - dan : Gift
- data : What is given; the premises on which an argument is based
- de bene esse : To act provisionally or in anticipation of a future occasion. The expression is used when anything is allowed to be done at the present time with a view to its being examined at a future time, and then standing or falling according to the merit of the thing in its own nature. In modern times it is chiefly used in reference to an examination, out of the court and before trial, of witnesses who are old, dangerously ill or about to leave the country, on the terms that if the witnesses continue ill or absent, then evidence be read at the trial, but if they recover or return, the evidence is taken in a usual manner.
- de bonis non : Of goods not administered. Where a sole or last surviving executor dies intestate without having fully administered, his administrator does not become the representative of the original testator, and it is accordingly necessary to appoint an administrator to administer the goods of the original testator left unadministered. This is a grant of administration cum testamento annexo
11de bonis non administratis, for short called de bonis non. This expression thus means that an administrator is appointed to succeed a deceased administrator to complete the administration of a intestate estate. - de die in diem : From day to day; continuously
- de executione facienda : Writs of execution
- de facto : In fact; really actual; actual state of circumstances independently of question of right or title A person in physical control or de facto possession may have an interest but no right to continue; whereas a person in possession, de jure, actually or constructively has the right to use, enjoy, destroy or alienate property (Krishna Kishore Firm v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1990 SC 2292)
- de hors : Outside of; unconnected with
- de jure : By right; rightful; independently of what obtains in fact
- de minimis non curat lex : The law does not concern itself with trifles. The Supreme Court in Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151.) observed that “they are not intended to be repeated by others or to be used in such a way as a book may be used, but still the principle de minimis non curat lex applies to a supposed wrong in taking a part of dramatic works, as well as in reproducing a part of a book.”
- de non apparentibus, et non existentibusm eadem est ratio : Of things which do not appear and things which do not exist, the role in legal proceedings is the same
- de novo : A new
- de odio et atia : Of malice and ill-will
- de propio motu : Of one’s own volition
- de recte : A writ of right
- de seisina habenda : For having seisin
- de son tort demesne : Of his own wrong
- debito justitiae : By debt of justice
- debitor non praesumitur donare : A debtor is not presumed to give
- debitum connexum : A debt giving rise to a lien
- debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro : A present debt is to be discharged in future. There is a distinction between a case where there is an existing debt, payment whereof is deferred, and a case where both the debt and its payment rest in the future. In the former case there is an attachable debt, in the latter case there is not. If, for instance, a sum of money is payable on the happening of a contingency, there is no debt owing or accruing. An accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation (CEPT v. Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd.[1957] 32 ITR 82 (SC).). The mere fact that the amount is not ascertained does not show that there is no debt. Standing alone, the word ‘debt’ is as applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future day as to a sum now due and payable. In other words debts are of two kinds : solvendumin praesenti and solvendum in futuro. A sum of money which is certain and in all events payable is a debt, without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency, however, is not a debt or does not become a debt, until the contingency happens. If there is a debt the fact that the amount is to be ascertained does not make it any the less a debt if the liability is certain and what remains is only the quantification of the amount (Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CWT [1966] 59 ITR 767 (SC) and also See E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC).).
- decree nisi : A decree is said to be made nisi when it is to take effect after a specified period or after the person affected by it failed to show cause against it within a certain time.
- del credere agent : An agent for the sale of goods who, in consideration of a higher reward than is usually given, guarantees the due payment of the price of all goods sold by him. The liability of a del credere agent is a contingent pecuniary liability, not a liability to perform the contract; it is a pecuniary liability to make good in the event of the default of the buyer in respect of a pecuniary liability. It does not extend to other obligations of the contract (Gabriel v. Churchull [1914] 3 KB 1272.). Del credere agent is a mere surety, liable only to his principal in case the purchaser makes a default.
- delegata potestas non potest delegare : A delegated power cannot be delegated
- delegatus non potest delegare : A delegate cannot delegate
- deus ex machina : Contrived or super natural device
- diem : Day
- dies : Days
- dies non : A day on which no legal business can be transacted
- diligentia : Diligence; care
- dixi : I have spoken
- doli incapax : Incapable of malice
- dolus : Fraud
- dolus auctoris non nocket successori : The fraud of a predecessor prejudices not his successor
- dominium : Right of possession, ownership
- dominus litis : The principal in a suit. The controller of a suit or litigation plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit and he may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed. But the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties. A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corpn. [1992] 2 SCC 524]. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is a necessary party, it may direct addition of that party. A person who is neither a necessary nor proper party, cannot be allowed to be impleaded as a party [Virtus Dordrecht B.V. v. Vikram Bhargav [2003] 8 ILD 299 (Delhi)]
- domitae naturae : Of tame disposition
- domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium : To every one his house is his surest refuge. Every man’shouse is his castle.
- donatio : Gift
- donatio inter vivos : A gift between living persons.
- donatio mortis causa : Donatio mortis causa (a gift by reason of death) is a gift of personal property in contemplation of death; a death-bed disposition; an inchoate gift of personality consummated by the giver’s death. To render this kind of gift valid, it must be made by the giver, when ill, in anticipation of his death and intended to take effect only upon his death by his existing illness, for his recovery from that illness, or his surviving the person to whom it was made, or his subsequent personal revocation of the gift, as by resuming its possession, will defeat it; and traditio or delivery, either actual or symbolical of subject of the gift or of the instrument which represents it must be made to the donee, either for his own use, or upon trust for another person, or for a particular purpose, e.g., the gift of a cheque upon the donor’s banker is not good as a donatio mortis causa, because it is a gift which can only be made effectual by obtaining payment of it in the donor’s life time and is revoked by his death; and so a promissory note not payable to bearer. But a deposit in the Post Office Savings Bank can be subject of such a gift. This kind of gift is deemed to pass on death. In case of a gift inter vivos the property may be either movable or immovable, but in the case of gift mortis causa the property must be movable. In the case of gift inter vivos the transfer is unconditional; in the case of gift mortis causa the transference is conditional and revocable. Further, the subject-matter of a gift inter vivos is the gratuitous transfer of property by one person to another where death is not necessarily contemplated while an essential element of gift mortis causa is that it is made in contemplation of death. A donatio mortis causa differs from legacy mainly in its being wholly independent of donor’s last will and testament and it, therefore, requires no probate and no assent on the part of his executor or administrator to give full effect to it. It resembles a legacy inasmuch as it is ambulatory, incomplete and revocable during the donor’s life; and is liable to his debts upon a deficiency of assets.
- donatio propter nuptias : A settlement made on the wife by the husband of a nature corresponding to dower
- dormiunt aliquando leges, nunquam moriuntur : The law sometimes sleep, never die
- droit : Right or law
- droit administratif : Administrative law
- dubitante : Doubting
- dum bene se gesserit : During good conduct
- dum fuit non compos mentis : While he was not of sound mind
- dum sola : While single or unmarried
- duplicatio : Doubling
- dura lex sed lex : The law is hard but it is the law If the language of the Act is sufficiently clear, the court has to give effect to it, however inequitable or unjust the result may be (see Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661)
- durante absentia : During absence
- durante bene placito : During the pleasure
- durante minore aetate : During minority
- durante vita : During life
- dying intestate : Dying in a state of intestacy. It merely refers to the status of the deceased1.
- E & OE : Errors and omissions excepted
- e contra : On the other hand; conversely
- e contraria : On the contrary
- e converso : Conversely
- e re nata : From this circumstance arisen; according to the exigencies of the case
- ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat : The burden of proof lies on him who alleges not on him who denies it.
- ei qui affirmat, non ei qui negat, incumbit probatio : The burden of proof lies on him who affirms a fact, and not on him who denies
- ejusdem generis : Of the same kind or nature Where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, a noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. One application of this general principle is the ejusdem generis rule. The true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive words. If a broadbased genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be (UP State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain AIR 1979 SC 65.). To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to the different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply. Unless there is a category, there is no room for application of the ejusdem generis doctrine and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning, they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association (Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 655 (SC).). The Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Sri Ramakrishna Motor Transport ([1983] 144 ITR 797.) held that there is no warrant to apply the principle of ejusdem generis and cut down the amplitude and power of rectification under section 154(1)(a) of the Income tax Act, 1961 to the orders of assessment and refund, more particular in view of the fact that words “assessment” and “refund” do not constitute a class.
- en autre droit : In the right of another
- en bloc : As one unit, piece, lump
- en masse : In a crowd, body, heap
- en route : On the road : let us go; march
- en ventre sa mere : In the womb of its mother. A child not yet born
- ens legis : A legal being, entity
- enure : To operate or take effect
- eo instante : At that instant
- eo nomine : In that name, by that name, on that claim
- eodem modo quo oritur, eodem modo dissolvitur : What has been effected by agreement can be undone by agreement
- equi aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum, licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit : He who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have done what is
right (see Satyavir Singh v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 555) - equity : Primarily fairness or natural justice
- equity, maxims of : – Equity acts in personam – Equity acts on the conscience – Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy – Equity follows the law – Equity looks to the intent rather than the form – Equity looks on that as done which ought to be done – Equity inputs an intent to fulfil an obligation – Equitable remedies are discretionary – Delay defeats equities – He who comes into equity must come with clean hands – He who seeks equity must do equity – Equity regards the balance of convenience – Where there are equal equities the law prevails – Where there are equal equities the first in time prevails – Equity, like nature, does nothing in vain – Equity never wants (i.e., lacks) a trustee – Equity aids the vigilant – Equality is equity – Equity will not assist a volunteer – Equity will not permit a statute to be a cloak for fraud
- errare est humanum : To err is human
- error qui non resistitur, approbatur : An error which is not resisted is approved
- estoppel : Estoppel may be defined as a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, but the whole concept is viewed as a substantive rule of law (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., re-issue, Vol 16; (1992), page 840, para 951). The rule of evidence of doctrine of law which precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement formerly made by him, or the existence of facts which he has by words or conduct led others to believe in. It is of four kinds : – By record – No person against whom it is producible shall be permitted to aver against it, e.g., a decision of a court – By deed – A person cannot dispute his own deed and cannot deny the truth of recitals contained in it – In pais – i.e., by conduct or representation, as that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord’s title – By conduct – Where a person has, by his declaration, act or omission permitted other to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny its truth. The basis of estoppel is that it would be unfair or unjust to allow a party to depart from a particular state of affairs which another has taken to be correct.1 Estoppel provides a shield and not a sword: it cannot create a cause of action. A legal status expressly denied by a statute cannot be conferred by estoppel (B.L. Sreedhar v. K.M. Munireddy [2003] 2 SCC 355) Estoppel may be defined as a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, but the whole concept is viewed as a substantive rule of law (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn., re-issue, Vol 16; (1992), page 840, para 951). The rule of evidence of doctrine of law which precludes a person from denying the truth of some statement formerly made by him, or the existence of facts which he has by words or conduct led others to believe in. It is of four kinds : – By record – No person against whom it is producible shall be permitted to aver against it, e.g., a decision of a court – By deed – A person cannot dispute his own deed and cannot deny the truth of recitals contained in it – In pais – i.e., by conduct or representation, as that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord’s title – By conduct – Where a person has, by his declaration, act or omission permitted other to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny its truth. The basis of estoppel is that it would be unfair or unjust to allow a party to depart from a particular state of affairs which another has taken to be correct. (Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd. [1956] 3 All ER 904.) Estoppel provides a shield and not a sword: it cannot create a cause of action. A legal status expressly denied by a statute cannot be conferred by estoppel (B.L. Sreedhar v. K.M. Munireddy [2003] 2 SCC 355)
- et cetera : And the rest, so on, so forth. When a list of things is given and the list concludes with the general words et cetera, the meaning of general words is restricted to things of the same class as those which are contained in the list. (Milne’s Trustees v. Davidson [1956] SLT 34.) The expression ‘et cetera’ does not share the character of an inclusive definition and cannot, therefore, enlarge the scope of the expression alongwith which it is used. (See K.V. Mathew v. Distt. Manager, Telephones AIR 1984 Ker. 40.)
- et seq: et squentes/sequentia : And those following.
- etat de droit : The state is submitted to the law
- ex : Out of
- ex acquo : Equally, equitably
- ex aequo et bono : In justice and in good faith (See Moses v. Macfertan [1760] 2 Burr. 1005 and Mahabir Kishore v. State of MP [1989] 2 CLA 228 (SC).)
- ex antecedentibus et consequentibus : From what goes before and what follows. The Supreme Court in Sunder Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim AIR 1959 SC 24, observed as follows: “…. the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected ex antecedentibus et consequentibus (i.e., from what goes before and what follows) every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and constant sense, if that may be done”
- ex capite : From memory
- ex cathedra : From the chair; with official authority
- ex concesso : Admittedly
- ex contractu : From a contract
- ex curia : Out of court
- ex debito justitiae : From what is due to justice. A remedy which the applicant gets as a matter of right. Every court of plenary jurisdiction has power to correct ex debito justitiae its judgment and order to prevent abuse of its process and grave and palpable errors. (See Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909.) The court is called upon to act ex debito justitiae to correct its own mistakes or orders inadvertently passed or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. For that matter every authority is entitled to correct its own mistakes, and taking any other view is bound to work out gross injustice and result in procedural imbalance. (See Chandrika Shah v. Addl. Member Board of Revenue 1981 BBCJ 106.) Review is, therefore, resorted only where glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in counter by judicial fallibility. (See Sow Chandra Kanta v. Sheik Habib AIR 1975 SC 1500.) Otherwise, the judgment pronounced by the court is final. A comprehensive list of defects that will attract ex debito justitiae relief cannot be drawn. It is sufficient to remember that the court can grant relief where there is some manifest illegality or want of jurisdiction in the earlier order or some palpable injustice is shown to have resulted. (Isaacs v. Robertson [1984] 3 All ER 140.) Such a power can be traced either to article 142 of the Constitution or to be powers, in the case of the Supreme Court, inherent in the court as the Apex Court and the guardian of the Constitution.
- ex delicto : Arising out of wrongs
- ex diuturnitate temporis omnia praesumuntur esse rite et solennitur acta : From lapse of time, all things are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly
- ex dolo malo non oritur actio : A right of action does not arise out of fraud
- ex dono : As a gift
- ex facie : On the first impression
- ex facto jus oritur : The law arises out of the fact
- ex gratia : As a matter of favour or grace The words ex gratia do not carry a necessary or even a probable implication that the agreement is to be without legal effect. It is a common experience amongst practitioners of law that a litigation or a threatened litigation is frequently compromised on the terms that a party shall make to the other a payment described as “ex gratia” or “without admission of liability”. The two phrases are synonymous. No one would imagine that a settlement so made is unenforceable at law. The words “ex gratia” or “without admission of liability” are used simply to indicate – it may be a matter of amour propre, or it
may be to avoid a precedent in subsequent cases – that a party agreeing to pay does not admit any pre-existing liability on his part; but he is certainly not seeking to preclude the legal enforceability of the settlement itself by describing the contemplated payment as “ex gratia” [Edwards v. Skyways Ltd. (1964) 1 WLR 349 (QB); CED v. Lalithamani [1979] 118 ITR 721 (Mad.)] - ex hypothesi : From the hypothesis; according to supposition being the basis of an enquiry
- ex maleficio non oritur contractus : A contract cannot arise out of an illegal act
- ex mero motu : Of one’s own free will, without compulsion, restraint
- ex nihilo nihil fit : Nothing could come out of nothing
- ex nudo pacto non oritur actio : No actum arises from a nude contract, i.e., a contract without consideration
- ex officio/off : By virtue of his office (Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology [2002] 5 SCC 111).
- ex parte : From, on behalf of, one side only
- ex post facto : By a subsequent act; retroactive, retrospective
- ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio : The best interpretation is made from the context (Gram Panchayat, Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings AIR 1990 SC 763)
- ex proprio motu : Of his own accord
- ex tempore : Off hand, without preparation
- ex turpi causa non oritur actio : An action cannot arise from a base cause It is a general proposition that an agreement to do an unlawful act cannot be supplied by law – that no right of action can spring out of an illegal contract and this rule, which applies not only where the contract is especially illegal, but whenever it is opposed to public policy or founded on an immoral consideration. (Kedar Nath Motani v. Prahlad Rai 1960 (1) SCR 861.) Court will not lend its aid to a person to achieve an illegal object (Smt. Surasaibalini Devi v. Phanindra Mohan Majumdar AIR 1965 SC 1364.). The Courts do not aid or do not become instrumental in enforcing transaction ex turpi causa. (LIC of India v. Devandrappa AIR 1987 Kar. 129, Salangar United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock [1968] 2 All ER 1073.)
- ex vicerbus actus : Within the four corners of this act. It is a rule of interpretation. Even apart from the compulsion of context, construction ex vicaribus actus is a settled rule and therefore, to ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look at the whole statement, at what precedes and what succeeds and not merely at the clause under construction irrespective of the setting of other relevant provisions in the scheme of the statute. (CIT v. Smt. Kamalini Khatau[1978] 112 ITR 652 (Guj.) (FB).)
- exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exceptis : An exception proves the rule concerning things not excepted
- executio est finis et fructus legis : Execution is the end and fruit of the law
- executo juris non habet injuriam : The execution of the process of law does no injury
- executor de son tort : Of his own wrong
- exempla illustrant, non restringunt, legem : Examples make the law clearer, do not restrict it.
- exempli gratia : For the purpose, of, example (abbreviated e.g.,)
- exor : An executor
- expedit reipublicae ne sua re quis male utatur : It is for the public good that no one uses his property badly
- expedit reipublicae ut finis sit litium : It is for the public good that there should be an end to litigation.
- expensae litis : Expenses of the cause
- expensilatio : Created by an entry in the account books of the creditor, with the consent of the debtor, charging the debtor as owing a certain sum.
- experientia docet : Experience teaches
- expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent : Things expressed harm, things not expressed do not
- expressio unius personae vel rei est exclusio alterius : The express mention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred (Gram Panchayat, Kanonda
20v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings AIR 1990 SC 763) It is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the Legislature. Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying the rule. (Parbhani Transport Co-op. Society Ltd. v. R.T.A. Aurangabad AIR 1960 SC 801.) Provisions sometimes found in the statutes, enacting imperfectly, or for particular cases only that which was already and more widely the law, have occasionally furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on this maxim (Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh 1957 SCR 370.). This maxim is a valuable servant but a dangerous master in the construction of statutes and documents. The Privy Council in William Blackburn v. John Flavelle [1881] 6 AC 628 adopting the principle in the above maxim, held, that when a particular mode is prescribed, no other mode can be adopted. - expressis verbis : In express terms, in so many words
- expressum facit cessare tacitum : When there is express mention of certain things, then anything not mentioned is excluded
- extenuate : To excuse, to treat (a fault) as less than it appears to be; as to extenuate a crime
- extra commercium : It means beyond commerce, i.e., which cannot be bought or sold, such as public roads, rivers, titles
of owners etc. [see Trayner’s Latin Maxims, Fourth Edition and State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd. (2004) 13 ILD 481 (SC)] - extra nostrum patrimonium : Things belonging not to individuals but to all men.
- f.o.b. : Free on board
- f.o.r. : Free on Railway
- facsimile : (Make it like) An exact copy
- factum : An act or deed
- factum est : It is done
- factum probanda : Facts which are required to be proved
- factum probantia : Facts which are given in evidence to prove other facts in issue
- factum valet or quod fieri non debuit : Where a fact is accomplished or where the act is done and completed, though in contravention of the directory provisions, the fact will stand and the act shall be deemed to be legal and binding. But where the provisions are mandatory, the principle does not apply
- fait : A deed
- fait accompli : An accomplished act
- fait justitia ruat caelum : Let right be done, though the heavens should fall
- falsa demonstratio : An erroneous description of a person or thing in a written instrument
- falsa demonstratio non nocet : A false description does not vitiate a document
- falsa demonstratio non nocet cum de corrore constat : Mere false description does not vitiate, if there be sufficient certainty as to the object. The rule
21signifies that where description is made up of more than one part, and one part is true, but the other false, there, if the part which is true describes the subject with sufficient legal certainty, the untrue part will be rejected and will not vitiate the devise; the characteristic of cases within the rule being that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject at all, and, so far as it is true, applies to one only (see Harikrishna Lal v. Babu Lal Marandi [2003] 8 SCC 613) - falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus : False in one, false in all. The Supreme Court held in Sohrab v. State of M.P. (AIR 1972 SC 2020.) that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule, for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries and embellishments. In Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa [2002] 8 SCC 381, the Supreme Court held that this principle is not applicable in India. It is only a rule of caution. Court has to separate chaff from grain and to find in each case as to what extent the evidence is acceptable. If separation is not possible, the entire evidence has to be rejected in toto.
- familia : Family
- felo de se : One who murders himself
- feme covert : A married woman
- feme sole : An unmarried woman
- festinatio justitiae est noverca infortunii : Swift justice is the step mother of misfortune
- fiat : Let it be done; a decree
- fiat justitia : Let justice be done
- fiat justitia, ruat coelum : Justice is the eventual destination of the litigation. Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Wilkes elegantly extorted that “Fiat justitia, ruat coelum” (Let justice be done though the heavens fall). [see CWT v. Meghji Girdharilal [1996] 220 ITR 357 (MP)]
- fictio cedit veritati : fictio juris non est ubi veritas : Fiction yields to truth; where there is truth fiction of law does not exist
- fictio legis neminem laedit : A legal fiction does not work loss or injustice
- fide jussor : A surety
- fieri facias : Cause to be done
- fieri non debuit sed, factum valet – ‘X’ : It ought not to have been done, but when done, it is binding
- fifa : Cause to be made
- fifo : First in, first out
- fihrist : A list, a catalogue; and inventory
- filium aquae : A thread or middle of a stream (parting properties)
- finis finem litibus imponit : A fine put an end to legal proceedings
- flagrante delicto : In the commission of the offence
- folio : Leaf of a paper etc., numbered only on front
- force majeure : Superior power; circumstances beyond one’s control, superior force, inevitable A reference to this expression is made where the intention is to save the defaulting party from the consequences of anything over which he had no control. (Dhanrajamal
22Gobindram v. Shamji Kalidas & Co. AIR 1961 SC 1285.) - forma non observata infertur adnullatio actus : Form not been observed, a nullity of the acts is inferred
- forum : A place; A Court
- fractionem diei non recipit lex : The law does not recognise any fraction of a day
- fraus est celare fraudem : It is fraud to conceal fraud
- fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent : Fraud and deceit should defend no man. (Pranab Kumar Dey v. Dibrugarh University AIR 1988 Gau. 61.)
- fraus et jus nunguam cohabitant : Fraud and justice never dwell together. (Pranab Kumar Dey v. Dibrugarh University AIR 1988 Gau. 61.) In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P.) Ltd. [1996] 5 SCC 550, the Supreme Court observed : “… This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the authorities, be they constitutional, statutory or administrative, (and particularly those who have decided a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders, if they are obtained by fraud as fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunguam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent)
- fraus omnia vitiat : Fraud vitiates everything Fraud means a false statement made knowingly, or without belief in its truth or recklessly, careless whether it be
true or false. (Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337.) - frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit : He who offends against the law vainly seeks the help of the law
- functus officio : Having discharged the duty. This expression means having fulfilled the function, having discharged the duty of the office or having accomplished the purpose, the person has no further force or authority. (See Ramsingh Gangaram v. State of M.P. AIR 1966 MP 24. Shoe Specialities (P.) Ltd. v. Standard Distilleries & Breweries (P.) Ltd. [1997] 90 Comp. Cas. 1 (Mad.).) The Supreme Court in the case of Baidyanath Dubey v. Deonandan Singh 1968 SCD 275 observed as follows: “It cannot be doubted that a Court has inherent powers to recall orders obtained by practising fraud on it, at the instance of a party to the proceedings. There is no question of the Court being functus officio because the Court retains the jurisdiction to recall such orders.”
- furviosi nulla voluntas est : A madman has no free will
- generale tantum valet in generalibus, quantum singulare in singulis : When words are general, they are to be taken in a general sense, just as words relating to a particular thing are to be taken as referring only to that thing
- generalia specialibus non derogant : Generalia specialibus non derogant, or,
23in other words “where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending to subjects specially dealt with by the earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier or special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of particular intention to do so” (see Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Man Mohan Dev AIR 1966 SC 1931). The literal meaning of this expression is that general words or things do not derogate from special. This expression was explained to mean that when there is conflict between a general and special provision, the latter shall prevail (CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons[1966] 60 ITR 392 (SC) and Union of India v. India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 35.), or the general provisions must yield to the special provisions. (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.) The maxim is regarded as a ‘cardinal principle of interpretation’ (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.), and is characterised as a well recognised principle. (See Secy. of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Society AIR 1931 PC 149 and Patna Improvement Trust v. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi AIR 1963 SC 1077.) The general provision, however, controls cases where the special provision does not apply as the special provision is given effect to the extent of its scope. (South India Corpn.
(P.) Ltd. v. Secretary Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207.) Thus a particular or a special provision controls or cuts down the general rule. (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.) In Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen (AIR 1977 SC 36.), the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether representation by a legal practitioner was permissible in an industrial dispute before adjudicatory authorities contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act. By applying this maxim, the Supreme Court held that the special provision in the Industrial Disputes Act would prevail in that regard over the Advocates Act which was held to be a general piece of legislation relating to subject-matter of appearance of lawyers before all courts, tribunals and other authorities, whereas Industrial Disputes Act was concerned with the representation by legal practitioners. This maxim was applied when the questions relating to assessments of a firm and its partners arose under the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the dissolution of the firm and its succession are held to be governed by the Special Act viz., the Income-tax Act and not the Partnership Act. The technical view of the nature of a partnership cannot be taken in applying the law of income-tax. Where a special provision is made in derogation of the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the effect is given to it. Where the provisions of the Indian
24Income-tax Act are clear, resort cannot be had to the provisions of another statute. (Dharam Pal Sat Dev v. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 302 (P&H) and Nandlal Sohanlal v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 170 (P&H) (FB).) When the Legislature has deliberately made a specific provision to cover a particular situation, for the purpose of making an assessment of a firm under the Income-tax Act, there is no scope for importing the concept and the provisions of the Partnership Act. (See CIT v. Shambulal Nathalal & Co.[1984] 145 ITR 329 (Kar.).) The legal position of a firm under the income-tax law is different from that under the general law of partnership in several respects : “In case of conflict between the two statutes, the general rule to be followed is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied: (i) The two are inconsistent with each other; (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment” (Ajay Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 1130) In determining whether a statute is special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and distinction cannot be blurred when finer points of law are dealt with. The Supreme Court in D.J. Bahadur’s (See
LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181.) case held that “…vis-á-vis ‘industrial disputes’ at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation, the Industrial Disputes Act is a special legislation and the LIC Act is a general legislation. Likewise, when compensation on nationalisation is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. An application of the generalis maxim as expounded by English textbooks and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the I.D. Act being special law prevails over the LIC Act which is but general law.” - generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda : General words are to be understood in a general way
- generalibus specialia derogant : Special things derogate from general things. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, the matter is excluded from the general provisions. Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held in its judgment in South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207 that the general provision under Article 372 of the Constitution regarding continuance of existing laws is subject to article 277 of the Constitution which is a special provision relating to taxes, duties, cesses, or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution. In Vinay Kumar Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board [2003] 8 ILD 318, the Patna High Court observed that article 351 of the Constitution of India is a
25general provision regarding development of Hindi all over India, whereas article 348 is a specific provision with regard to the language to be used in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and that, therefore, the applicability of article 351 of the Constitution is entirely obviated. - grammatica falsa non vitiat chartum : False grammar does not vitiate a deed
- gratis dictum : A mere assertion unsupported by evidence
- habeas corpus : This means ‘you have the body’
- habendum : The clause in the conveyance which indicates the quantity of interest conveyed
- hac lege : With this law, under this condition
- hereditas : Inheritance
- hereditas jacen : Inheritance not taken up
- heres : The universal successor of a deceased person
- heres factus : Heir appointed by Will
- heres natus : Heir by descent
- hiba-ba-shart-up-iwuz : It is a gift with stipulation for return
- hiba-bil-iwaz : A gift for a consideration. It is in reality a sale
- hifo : Highest in, first out
- hoc anno : In this year
- hoc genus omni : All of this sort, class
- hoc tempore : At this time
- honest vivere, non alienum laeders, suum lunique tribute : To live honourably, not to injure another, to render each his due. These are the three percepts of law [Mrs.
Banoo E. Cowasji v. CIT [1997] 223 ITR 40 (MP)] - hors de purpose : Aside from this purpose
- IOU : I owe you
- ibid (inbidem), id : In the same place, case
- id certum est quod certum reddi potest : That is certain which can be made certain
- id est, i.e. : That is to say, namely
- id genus omne : All that class or kind
- idem : The same
- idem per idem : An illustration or proof
- idem quod, i.q. : The same as
- ignorantia eorum quae quis scire tenetur non excusat : Ignorance of those things which everyone is bound to know does not constitute an excuse
- ignorantia facti excusat : Ignorance of fact excuses
- ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis : The ignorance of a judge is the misfortune of the innocent
- ignorantia juris, quod quisque scire tenetur non excusat : Ignorance of the law which everybody is supposed to know does not afford excuse
- ignorantia legis neminem excusat : Ignorance of law excuses nobody (Basheshar Nath v. CIT AIR 1959 SC 149)
- ignoratio elenchi : Ignoring the point in question
- impossibilium nulla obligatio est : Impossibility is an excuse for the non-performance of an obligation
- impotentia excusat legem : Impotency excuses law. Inability is an excuse. Law does not compel to do what one cannot possibly perform (In the matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 [2002] 8 SCC237). When law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, then the law in general will excuse him – (R.M. Bagal v. Union of India AIR 1994 Delhi 173)
- imputatio : Legal liability
- in : “In” in Latin means “not”
- in absentia : In absence
- in aequali jure melior est conditio possidentis : When the rights of the parties are equal, the claim of the actual possessor is the stronger.
- in aeterum : Forever
- in alio loco : In another place
- in ambiguis orationibus maxime sententia spectanda est ejus qui eas protulisset : In dealing with ambiguous words the intention of him who used them should specially be regarded
- in arbitrium judicis : At the discretion of the judge
- in articulo mortis : At the point of death
- in autredroit : In another’s right
- in bonis : In the goods of
- in camera : The hearing of a case in the judge’s chamber; secretly
- in capite : In chief
- in casu extremae necessitatis omnia sunt communia : In case of extreme necessity, everything is in common
- in commendam : In trust
- in conjunctivis oportet utrumque, in disjunctivis sufficiet alteram partem esse veram : In conjunctives both must be true; in disjunctives it is sufficient if one is true
- in consimili casu : In a like case
- in contractis tacite insunt quae sunt moris et consuetudinis : The clauses which are in accordance with custom and usage are an implied part of every contract
- in contumacium : As an act of contumacy
- in conventionibus contrahentium voluntas potius quam verba spectari placuit : In construing agreements the intention of the parties, rather than the words actually used, should be considered
- in curia : In the court
- in custodia legis : In the custody of law
- in dubio : In doubt
- in esse : In existence
- in extenso : In full length
- in extremis : At the very end
- in fieri : In the state of becoming; in the process of being realised
- in flagrante delicto : Caught in the very act of committing a crime
- in futuro : In future, henceforth
- in gremio legis : In the bosom of law
- in gross : A right that is not appendant, appurtenant, or otherwise annexed to land
- in invitum : Against an unwilling party
- in jure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur : In law the proximate and not the remote cause is to be regarded [Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly (1914) AC 657; National Insurance Co. v. Shiv Dutt Sharma [2003] 7 ILD 368 (J & K)]
- in limine : At the outset
- in loco parentis : In the place of a parent
- in media res : In the midst of the matter
- in nomine : In the name of
- in nostro patrimonio : Things belonging to individuals
- in nubibus : Confused, in the cloud
- in nuce : In a nutshell; briefly
- in pais : By conduct, representation; In the country
- in pari causa potior est conditio possidentis : Everyone may keep what he has got, until and unless someone else can prove a better title
- in pari delicto, potior est conditio possidentis : Where both parties are equally in fault, the condition of the possession is the best. This maxim has much relevance to the money paid by mistake and the refusal to refund resulting in the unjust enrichment. The money may not be recoverable if in paying and receiving it the parties were in pari delicto. (See Mahabir Kishore v. State of MP [1989] 2 CLA 228 (SC).) Tax paid under mistake of law is refundable. A person is entitled to recover money paid by mistake or under coercion, and if it is established that the payment, even though it be tax, has been made by the person labouring under a mistake of law, the party receiving the money is bound to repay or return it though it might have been paid voluntarily, subject, however, to questions of estoppel, waiver, limitation or the like. (See STO v. Kanhaiyalal [1959] SCR 1350.) The person and the Government in paying and receiving are not in pari delicto; and, therefore, the aforesaid person is entitled to recover the amount. The amount does not become recoverable if in paying and receiving both the payer and the recipient are in fault, i.e., they are pari delicto. Where each party is equally in fraud, the law favours him who is actually in possession, or where both parties are equally guilty, the estate will lie where it was. (Immani Appa Rao v. Collapalli Ramalingamurthi [1962] 3 SCR 739 and also see Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co. AIR 1959 SC 689.)
- in pari materia (in pari causa) : In an analogous cause, case or position
- in perpetuum : Forever
- in personam : An act or proceeding done or directed against or with reference to a specific person, as opposed to in rem
- in plino : In full
- in posse : Potentiality, within possibility
- in praesenti : Present, existing
- in principio : In the beginning
- in propria persona : In person
- in re : In the matter of; concerning
- in rem : On the status of some particular subject-matter. An act, proceeding or right available against the world at large, as opposed to in personam. A right of property is a right in rem A judgment in rem, e.g., judgments or orders passed in admiralty, probate proceedings etc. would always be admissible irrespective of whether they are inter-parties or not. A judgment which is not inter-parties is inadmissible in evidence, except for the limited purpose of proving as to who the parties were and what was the decree passed and the properties which were the subject-matter of the suit. The recitals in the judgment like findings given in appreciation of evidence made or arguments or generalogy referred in the
- in situ : In the original position, place
- in solido/solidum : In the whole, applied to a joint contract
- in specie : In the same, similar form. In its own form and essence, and not in its equivalent
- in status quo :
- In its former state, condition
- in terrorem : A condition in a will or gift which is intended to frighten or intimidate, as a warning, is void
- in totidem verbis : In so many words
- in toto : Completely; entirely
- in transitu : In the course of transit
- in utero : In the womb; not yet born
- in vacuo : In a vacuum
- in venit : Devised
- in vivo : In the living or organism
- inclusio unius est exclusio alterius : The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another
- inequity : In justice unfairness
- infra : Below lower down, further on (in a book)
- infra dignitatem curiae : Beneath one’s dignity
- iniquum est aliquem rei sui esse judicem : It is unjust for anyone to be judge in his own case; no one should be a judge in his own case
- injuria : A legal wrong
- injuria non excusat injuriam : One wrong does not justify another
- injuria sine damno : Injury without damages. Whenever there is an invasion of a legal right, the person in whom the right is vested is entitled to bring an action and may be awarded damages although he has suffered no actual damage. The law presumes damage owing to the mischievous tendency of the act and therefore, prohibits it absolutely. In short, a man is entitled to have his person and property preserved inviolable. Every injury imports a damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing; a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage when a man is thereby hindered of his right. (Ashby v. White [1703] 2 Ld. Raym 938.)
- innuendo : Oblique hint or allusive remark
- inquisitio : Inquiry
- intelligible differentia : Difference capable of being understood
- inter alia : Among other things
- inter arma silent leges : Amid wars laws are silent
- inter nos : Between ourselves; a matter to be kept secret
- inter se : Between; among themselves
- inter vivos : Among the living
- interesse termini : Interest of term
- interest reipublicae : It concerns the State. It is the basic principle of legal policy that law should serve the public interest. Hence, the Latin maxim interest reipublicae which points out that every legal system must concern itself with the public interest [Union of India v. Kurukundu Balakrishnaiah [2004] 16 ILD 463 (AP) (FB)].
- interest reipublicae ne maleficia remaneant impunita : It is a matter of public concern that wrong-doings are not left unpunished.
- interest reipublicae ne sua re quis male utatur : It is in the interest of the State that no one should make a wrongful use of his property
- interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium : It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law suit
- interpretatio chartarum benigne facienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat : The construction of deed is to be made
liberally, that the thing to have effect than to be made void - intra vires : With one’s powers
- inverso ordine : In the reverse order
- invito beneficium non datur : A benefit is not conferred upon anyone against his consent
- ipse dixit : Dogmatic statement resting on bare authority. An assertion made by a person, but without proof or foundation; a dogmatic pronouncement
- ipsissima verba : The identical words; the very words
- ipso facto : By that very fact; thereby
- ipso jure : By the law itself; by the operation of law
- ita utere tuo ut alienum non laedas : Use your own property so as not to injure your neighbour
- iterum : Again
- iwaz-nama : Deed of exchange
- judex est lex loquens : A judge is the law speaking
- judex non potest esse testis in propria causa : A judge cannot be witness in his own cause
- judici officium suum excedenti non paretur : Effect is not to be given to the decision of a judge delivered in excess of his jurisdiction
- judicia publica : Public prosecutions
- judicis est jus dicere, non dare : It is for the judge to administer, not to make law
- judicium dei : The judgment of God. Trial by ordeal
- jura in personam : The rights of persons
- jura non remote causa sed proxima spectatur : In law the immediate or the proximate and not theremote cause of any event is regarded
- jura publica anteferenda privatis : Public rights are preferred to private
- jura regalia : Sovereign rights
- jura rerum : The rights which a person acquires in things
- juratores sunt judices facti : Juries are the judges of fact
- jure divino : By divine law
- jure naturae aequum est neminem cum-alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem : It is the law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. Thus, who seeks equity must do equity [Babu Lal v. DIT [2005] 147 Taxman 318 (All.)]
- jure uxoris : By reason of wife’s right
- juris et de jure : Of law and from law The Supreme Court in the case of B. L. Sreedhar v. K. M. Munireddy [2003] 1 ILD 185 observed : “Estoppel is based on the maxim, allegans contraria non est audiendus (a party is not to be heard to allege the contrary) and is that species of presumption juries et de jure – (absolute or conclusive or irrebuttable presumption), where the fact presumed is taken to be true, not as against all the world, but against a particular party, and that only by reason of some act done, it is in truth a kind of argumentum ad hominem”
- juris peritus : One learned in the law
- juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum unique tribuere : These are the precepts of the law, to live honestly, to hurt no one, and to give to every man his own
- jus : Law, right, equity, authority, rule The word “jus” is defined by the Century Standard Dictionary as conforming to the requirements of right or positive law. In Anderson’s Law Dictionary as probable, reasonable [see Mrs. Helen C. Rebello v. MSRTC [1999] 95 Comp. Cas. 509 (SC)]
- jus accrescendi : The right of accrual. The right of survivorship between joint tenants
- jus ad rem : The right to possess a thing, an inchoate and imperfect right
- jus ad rem alienum acquirendum : A right to the offer of a thing about to be sold is not identical to the right to thing itself, and that is the primary right of the pre-emptor. (Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh AIR 1958 SC 838.)
- jus decere : To pronounce judgment to give the legal decision
- jus decere et non jus dare : To pronounce the judgment and not to make law [CST v. Parson Tools &Plants [1975] 35 STC 413 (SC)]
- jus est norma recti, et quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria : Law is rule of right ; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is a wrong [Kailash Suneja v. Appropriate Authority [1998] 231 ITR 318 (Delhi)]
- jus ex injuria non oritur : A right cannot arise to anyone out of his own wrong
- jus gentium : The law of nations. The law common to all peoples. The rules of private law, recognised generally by different nations
- jus haereditatis : The right to inherit
- jus honorarium : Magisterial law
- jus husbendi : The right to be put in actual possession of the property
- jus in personam : A right against a specific person
- jus in re/rem : A complete and full right, a real right, or a right to have a thing to the exclusion of all other men
- jus mariti : The right of a husband to a wife’s property
- jus merum : Pure mere right
- jus naturale : Law of nature
- jus non scriptum : The unwritten law
- jus publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest : Public law is not to be superseded by private agreements
- jus quaestium terito : Rights on account of third parties
- jus sanguinis : The right of blood; the right of a child to the citizenship of his parents
- jus scriptum : The written part of the law consisting of statutes etc.
- jus spatiandi et manendi : The right to stay and remain
- jus tertii : The right of third party
- jus titulo : By legal right; lawfully
- jus/les respicit aequitatem : Law has regard to equity
- justicias facere : To exercise judicial functions
- justitia : Justice
- justitia est duplex; viz., severe puniens et vere praeveniens : Justice is doubt; punishing with severity, preventing with lenity
- justitia non est neganda, non differenda : Justice is neither to be denied nor postponed
- justitia non novit patrem nec matrem, solam veritatem spectat justitia : Justice knows neither father nor mother, but regards truth alone
- kompetenz – kompetenz or competence de la competence : The doctrine means that the Tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. Section 16(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, incorporates this doctrine. It recognises and enshrines an important principle that initially and primarily, it is for the arbitral tribunal itself to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the matter, subject of course, to ultimate court control. Kompetenz – Kompetenz is a widely accepted feature of the modern international arbitration, and allows the arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction including ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, subject to final review by a competent court of law [Justice C.K. Thakker in S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. [2005] 128 Comp. Cas. 465 (SC)]
- lata culpa dolo aequiparatur : Gross negligence is equivalent to fraud. Negligence is not fraud. Fraud is dishonesty, and it is not necessarily dishonest, though it may be negligent, to express a belief on the grounds that would not convince a reasonable man. The law does not require a representor to warrant the truth of his statement, but insists that he shall warrant his belief in its truth. A fraudulent misrepresentation is a false statement which, when made, the representor did not honestly believe it to be true (Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337). Distinction between negligence and fraud, thus, is never blurred. If a person honestly believes that what he asserts is true, the statement thus made is not fraudulent though it may be negligent. But gross negligence would mean fraud. Even if a person does not have a wrongful intention or even a conscious or deliberate act may not be there, but the negligence is of severe type and the carelessness is so aggravated in nature as to indicate a mental attitude of indifference to the known or obvious risks. Thus ‘gross negligence’ means greater negligence than the absence of ordinary care. It is such a degree of negligence as excludes the loosest degree of care, and is said to amount to dolus. (Cashill v. Wright [1856] 6 E & B 891.)
- legatum : Legacy legatum generis : A legacy of thing in general terms as belonging to a class
- legatum nominis : A legacy of a debt
- legatum optionis : A legacy of choice
- legatum partitionis : A legacy where the legatee divided the inheritance with the heir
- legatum poenae nomine : A legacy by way of penalty to constrain their heir to do or not to do something
- leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant : Later laws abrogate prior contrary laws
- lex : Lawlex dilationes semper exhorret : The law always abhors delays
- lex domicilii : The law of the place of a person’s domicile
- lex est dictamen rationis : Law is the dictate of reasons
- lex est tutissima cassis sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur : Law is the safest helmet; under the shield of law none are deceived. This principle is well recognised from th days of Magna Carta [Mrs. Kailash Suneja v. Appropriate Authority [1998] 231 ITR 318 (Delhi)]
- lex fori : The law of the place of action
- lex loci contractus : The law of the place where a contract is made
- lex loci delictus : The law of the country where a tort has been committed
- lex loci rei sitae : The law of the place where a thing is situate
- lex loci solutionis : The law of the place of performance
- lex marcatoria : The law of merchant
- lex non cogit ad impossibilia : The law does not compel the impossible. The performance of impossible duty may be excused. (Cochin State Power & Light Corpn. Ltd. v. The State of Kerala AIR 1965 SC 1688.) The law itself and the administration of it must yield to that which everything must bend to necessity; the law, in its most positive and pre-emptory injunctions is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases. ( Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey [1987] 4 SCC 398; Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. [2000] 4 SCC 342.)
- lex non curat de minimis : The law cares not about trifles
- lex non requirit verificari quod apparet curiae : The law does not require that which is apparent to the court to be verified
- lex non scripta : The unwritten law. The common law derived from judicial decisions and customs
- lex posterior derogat priori : A later Act overrules an earlier one
- lex rei situs : The law of the situation of the thing
- lex scripta : Statute law
- lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi : The law always intends what coincides with reason [Mrs. Kailash Suneja v. Appropriate Authority [1998] 231 ITR 318 (Delhi)]
- lex spectat naturae ordinem : The law regard to the order of the nature
- lex talionis : The law of retaliation